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In 2008, the seasonal forecast issued at the Seasonal Climate Outlook Forum for West Africa (PRESAO) announced a high risk
of above-normal rainfall for the July–September rainy season. With probabilities for above-normal rainfall of 0.45, this forecast
indicated noteworthy increases in the risk of heavy rainfall. When this information reached the International Federation of Red
Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) West and Central Africa Oﬃce, it led to significant changes in the organization’s flood
response operations. The IFRC regional oﬃce requested funds in advance of anticipated floods, prepositioned disaster relief items
in strategic locations across West Africa to benefit up to 9,500 families, updated its flood contingency plans, and alerted vulnerable
communities and decision-makers across the region. This forecast-based preparedness resulted in a decrease in the number of
lives, property, and livelihoods lost to floods, compared to just one year prior in 2007 when similar floods claimed above 300
lives in the region. This article demonstrates how a science-based early warning informed decisions and saved lives by triggering
action in anticipation of forecast events. It analyses what it took to move decision-makers to action, based on seasonal climate
information, and to overcome traditional barriers to the uptake of seasonal climate information in the region, providing evidence
that these barriers can be overcome. While some institutional, communication and technical barriers were addressed in 2008,
many challenges remain. Scientists and humanitarians need to build more common ground.
1. Introduction
1.1. West Africa’s Vulnerability to Climate Shocks. Seasonal-
to-interannual variability of the climate system has major
impacts on the populations of West Africa, one of the world’s
lowest-income regions. Here, 75% of the active population
is employed in a rain fed agricultural sector [1], which is
highly climate sensitive. Only 2 percent of the total cultivated
land in West Africa is irrigated or under some other form of
water management, the remaining 98% being rain fed [1].
In countries such as Niger or Burkina Faso, up to 92% of
the active population is employed in the rain-fed agricultural
sector [1]. A growing majority of the population also lives in
ill-planned urban shantytowns built on flood plains where
they settled during the prolonged Sahelian drought period
from the early 1970s to the late 1980s [2, 3]. The droughts
drove peasants out of the countryside and into unplanned
periurban settlements where functioning drainage systems
are rare and so are vulnerable to flooding [4, 5]. Fifteen of
West Africa’s seventeen countries lie at the bottom of the
human development ladder, according to the United Nations
Development Program Human Development Index ranking,
and are classified among the twenty-two poorest countries in
the world [6].
Against this context of high exposure to climate vari-
ability and low coping capacity, even slight changes in
2 International Journal of Geophysics
temperatures and expected rainfall patterns can aﬀect vast
numbers of vulnerable people. Thus, when natural hazards
occur in the region, they tend to cause disasters that increase
poverty further. Disasters result from the combination of
naturally driven hazards, human-induced conditions of
vulnerability, and insuﬃcient capacity or measures to reduce
the potential negative consequences of risk [7].
1.2. Science-Based Forecasts to Benefit the Most Vulnerable.
The extreme vulnerability of West Africa to climate vari-
ability makes the region an ideal potential beneficiary of
the type of seasonal climate information provided through
the Regional Climate Outlook Forums (RCOFs; [8]). The
Pre´visions Saisonnie`res en Afrique de l’Ouest (PRESAO),
West Africa’s Seasonal Outlook Forum, was established in
1998 and has occurred annually each May to provide a
consensus forecast for the coming July–September rain-
fall season. The PRESAO brings together scientists and
hydrologists from National Meteorological and Hydrological
Services (NMHSs), and regional and international climate
centers to discuss and agree on the forecast for the July-
August-September (JAS) rainy season over West Africa. This
consensus-based forecast issued at the end of the PRESAO
forum is considered an authoritative voice on conditions
most likely to prevail over the upcoming JAS season in West
Africa, Cameroon, and Chad.
In the past, seasonal forecasts have been underutilized for
many reasons. Institutionally, there had been no sustained
dialogue between climate institutions and humanitarians in
the region in the past. Culturally, a shift was needed from a
mindset of disaster response to one of preparedness and early
action. Financially, convincing donors to fund preparedness
activities for predicted events that were only probable,
not certain, was a challenge. Technically, information pro-
vided by meteorologists was largely incomprehensible to
the regional decision maker/disaster manager/Red Cross
volunteers. Scientifically, the information was often not
salient to the latter’s information needs and was given in
terms of probabilities to reflect uncertainty inherent in the
forecast, requiring new strategies for taking decisive action.
Not unique to West Africa, this disconnect between
forecasters and humanitarians partly explains why vulner-
able populations worldwide continue to be impacted by
predictable natural hazards, as illustrated, for instance, by
the 2005 famine in Niger, cyclone Nargis in Myanmar, and
hurricane Katrina in the United States [9]. Despite the
significant potential of early information about likely cli-
matic hazards to aid vulnerable groups in better coping with
climate variability, save lives, and preserve livelihoods in this
highly climate-sensitive region, across Africa there are only a
few haphazard instances of successful transmission and use
of available climate and weather forecasts, and other climate
risk management tools by policy makers and communities at
risk.
1.3. Challenges to the Uptake of Seasonal Climate Information
in Africa. Regional climate outlook forums (RCOFs) are
the chief means through which seasonal climate forecasts
are developed for subregions within Africa. RCOFs are held
on an annual or biannual basis in advance of the rainy
season, with the seasonal forecast usually developed for a
90-day climate window and at national or regional scales.
Forecasts are expressed in probabilistic terms, reflecting
the likelihood of below-normal, normal, or above-normal
rainfall. Following the rainy season, some simple verification
analyses are performed, but end-user communities are
typically not included in retrospective analyses to understand
the use and value of preseason information.
The top-down information flow that characterizes the
RCOF process tends to preclude input from intended ben-
eficiaries as to how forecasts can best be translated to address
specific societal needs, or how to develop knowledge pack-
ages that bundle climate predictions with information about
appropriate remedial actions or other livelihood priorities
[10–12]. This reliance on RCOFs as the predominant vehicle
for seasonal forecast dissemination has proven inadequate
for reaching vulnerable populations and being integrated
into their decision making processes [11].
Patt and Gwata [13] delivered seasonal forecasts to
farmers in four villages in Zimbabwe, one in each of the
country’s four predominant natural regions, between 2000
and 2001. Their experience shows that the factors constrain-
ing use of the forecasts by the farmers include: (i) credibility
(communities do not trust the message), (ii) legitimacy (lack
of trust in the people who deliver the message, that is, the
messengers), (iii) scale (the need for better geographic and
temporal downscaling of region-wide seasonal forecasts),
(iv) cognition (if users do not understand a forecast, they
will not use it), (v) procedures (a forecast that arrives too
late, after farmers have already purchased their crops and
fertilizers for the season, is not salient to their needs), and
(vi) choices (when forecast does not contain enough new
information, decisions will not be changed based on a
forecast).
Thus, the causes of limited dissemination and use of
seasonal information across Africa appear to be as follows:
(a) lack of outreach to key stakeholders at the national
and subnational levels, such as disaster management
agencies, public health oﬃcials, community-based
humanitarian organizations, and water managers,
including vulnerable groups, such as urban slum
dwellers, farmers, and fishermen; in line with the
lack of outreach to key stakeholders, the inexistence
of communication systems to communicate hazard
alerts to communities at risk.
(b) poor interpretation and communication of forecasts;
(c) forecasts in their current form are insuﬃciently
relevant to information needs and decision making
timelines (non-salience);
(d) inability to act on forecasts;
(e) lack of trust in seasonal forecasts.
Can these systemic constrains to seasonal climate informa-
tion use be overcome? If so, what is required to spur decision
makers to action based on ex-ante seasonal predictions?
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In the following section, we review each of these con-
straints and then proceed to analyze the no-regret strate-
gies carried out by the International Federation of Red
Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) ahead of the
2008 floods in West Africa that substantially helped to
address the constraints to seasonal forecast use for disaster
prevention. These strategies included mobilizing funding
ex-ante flooding occurrence, hiring an in-house intern to
translate scientific seasonal climate information into lay
language operational for decision making, prepositioning
disaster relief items across the region in the likely event that
the forecast materialized, securing partnerships with regional
climate production centers, as well as training additional staﬀ
and communicating the seasonal forecast through trusted
Red Cross branches and community volunteers at the na-
tional and subnational levels.
2. Background: Constraints to Use of
Climate Information
2.1. Lack of Outreach to Key Stakeholders at the National
and Subnational Levels. The content and process of existing
climate information are not adequately designed to reach
vulnerable groups dwelling at the most basic geographic
levels, that is, villages or marginalized urban settlements
[4, 14]. Community radios constitute an eﬀective means of
reaching remote communities with information, but they are
only seldom used to ensure that forecasts reach vulnerable
communities in the region [15, 16]. The lack of operational
community-level relays of climate information, media out-
lets, and information-sharing systems that ensure the trick-
ling down of climate information to the communities that
most need it further constrains the ability of communities to
access forecasts. For example, in Southern Africa, available
forecast information does not specifically target vulnerable
groups, and so the information either does not reach the
community level at all or fails to reach the moremarginalized
groups [10, 17–20].
2.2. Poor Communication of Forecasts. Issues relating to lan-
guage, content, and format of forecasts compound the poor
accessibility of climate information. Indeed, these aspects
of the forecast are not adequately considered to ensure
forecast comprehension by community-level users [10, 14,
17, 19]. In Southern Africa, for example, very few NMHSs
translate their forecasts beyond English, potentially exclud-
ing the most vulnerable yet important sectors of the target
population (e.g., farmers, pastoralists, fishermen, and urban
slum dwellers) from receiving and being able to use the
forecasts [10]. Also, the probabilistic nature of seasonal
forecasting is prone to misinterpretation and confusion if
probabilities are translated into deterministic statements and
warnings or are otherwise manipulated.
2.3. Nonsalience of Current Forecasts (Scientific Barrier). The
current content and mode of climate information does not
eﬀectively address many of the concerns of community-level
stakeholders, due to present limits in climate forecasting
science. This lack of relevance, or specificity, in seasonal
forecasts has multiple dimensions, including issues of poor
spatial resolution of forecasts with respect to local-scale
decision making needs, and an absence of information about
intraseasonal rainfall distribution, as well as about cli-
mate parameters other than rainfall. Improving the local
specificity of climate information in Africa will require
greater investments in infrastructure to support hydro-mete-
orological applications. In Africa, the density of meteorolog-
ical stations is about eight times lower than the minimum
recommended by the World Meteorological Organization
(WMO); many of these stations are nonfunctional and
governments have failed to invest in equipment and trained
personnel [21].
While rainfall is the chief concern for many end users,
providing information about other climate parameters, such
as relative humidity and temperature, would help countries
to monitor soil moisture conditions in cropping areas
and protect particular commodities, such as livestock, if
temperatures exceed critical thresholds. For example, Ingram
et al. [22] found that farmers in diﬀerent agroecological
zones in Burkina Faso were interested in receiving seasonal
precipitation forecasts, but they were much more interested
in receiving forecasts of when the rains would start and end,
and whether there would be interruptions in rains.
Also related to insuﬃcient forecast specificity is the
apparent or potential lack of relevance of seasonal climate
forecasts in some situations. For example, contradictions can
exist between climatologically and agronomically optimal
windows for seeding crops in high-risk farming environ-
ments. While the former relies on evidence from large-scale
weather and climate dynamics to determine the “safe” start
of the growing season, the latter considers eﬀects of nitro-
gen leaching, weed competition, pest pressure, and seedl-
ing damage from heavy precipitation in deciding when to
begin cultivation [23].
2.4. Low Capacity to Act on Forecasts. Climate information
must compete with other livelihood demands, and while
there may be sound climate-related reasons for heeding a
forecast, there are often equally compelling reasons not to,
particularly where resources or capacity are inadequate for
eﬀective action. The extent to which knowledge and infor-
mation are acted upon at the local level depends upon per-
ceptions of risk from current and future hydrometeorological
hazards, as well as the influence that the array of nonclimate
factors bring to bear on the risk calculus. Grothmann and
Patt [24] describe how farmers in Zimbabwe, given a forecast
of below-normal rainfall, still chose to grow maize over
millet when the potential crop loss risks from drought were
weighed against the substantial risks that might ensue from
not growing maize, given the extent to which institutional,
societal, and market forces were aligned in favor of maize
production.
If farmers lack suﬃcient access to inputs, land, equip-
ment and other capital, and credit, then they generally
cannot eﬀectively apply climate information, as in Southern
Africa [18, 19]. Similarly, in Burkina Faso, farmers need
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greater access to basic agricultural technologies, such as
plows, new crop varieties, and fertilizers, before they could
benefit fully from precipitation forecasts [15]. Bundling
capacity building eﬀorts for seasonal climate forecast use
with timely access to credit or agricultural production inputs
can help lower the threshold for acting on climate forecast
information. The dissemination of the forecasts should be
part of an extension package that includes a discussion of
the probabilistic nature of the forecasts, potential response
strategies, and risk management [22]. Social constraints,
for example, the inability of younger decision makers to
bypass family hierarchy in changing decisions about resource
allocation and crop choice for a given season, can also
constrain the ability to act on forecasts [15].
2.5. Lack of Trust in the Forecasts. Before communities can
absorb incoming scientific information, trust needs to be
built because acting on the information could mean shifting
decisions and making costly, high-risk investments. Caution
is justifiable given the marginality of household resources
within many vulnerable communities. Building a trusting
relationship between communities at risk from climate
hazards and forecasters (or their messengers) is of cen-
tral importance in understanding whether community-level
decision makers will use received forecasts or not. One way
to instill understanding of and trust in climate information is
through the use of participatory workshops designed to help
farmers and other target groups to better understand and
use seasonal climate forecasts [22]. These workshops can
improve trust and credibility of forecasts and provide an
opportunity for farmers to experience repeated exposure to
and become familiar with the concepts behind probabilistic
forecasting, thus allowing better comprehension of what
forecasts can and cannot do. Workshop participation can
positively influence the anticipatory behavior of participants,
through broadening their perceived range of options for
the coming cultivation season, and the workshops provide
spillover eﬀects to the larger community as participants share
information with nonparticipants.
An example from Mali illustrates well the importance
of participatory processes in communicating climate infor-
mation to community-level stakeholders. The Direction
Nationale de la Me´te´orologie du Mali, the country’s NMHS,
has been transmitting detailed agrometeorological informa-
tion to groups of farmers since 1983. They have found that
the participatory processes developed to provide agrometeo-
rological advice to farmers have aided understanding of how
to provide the information in a comprehensible and suitable
manner, such that it is congruent with traditional practices
or agricultural calendars [16]. Forecasters at Mali’s national
meteorological agency found that they could not hold
stakeholder meetings in all the villages where demand for
agrometeorological advice was increasing, so they gradually
scaled up the project while heavily relying on rural radios and
dispensing advisories for wider regions and for each diﬀerent
crop type.
Figure 1 summarizes the bottlenecks that have tradition-
ally constrained the use of climate forecasts in Africa, and
1- Gap between climate information
providers and end-users
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Figure 1: The bottlenecks to climate information access and use by
vulnerable communities in West Africa (source: [14]).
their trickling down to communities most at risk. Despite
these barriers to the use of climate information, in 2008, the
seasonal forecast for West Africa was utilized by a regional
humanitarian organization, the IFRC oﬃce of West and
Central Africa, to plan its disaster response operations for
the flood season, and as a result, lives and livelihoods were
preserved in the region. In the next sections of this paper, we
attempt to understand what changed in 2008 to enable the
use of seasonal forecast information by a decision maker in
the region, and how this year diﬀered from just a year prior
when flood disasters aﬀected West Africa.
3. Methods
In order to understand the processes that triggered IFRC’s
utilization of the 2008 seasonal forecast, we undertook a
number of process tracing steps. Firstly, we compared IFRC’s
disaster management strategies in 2008 with those in 2007,
when the signals of probable flood conditions were not used
to trigger preparedness measures. Secondly, we traced the
processes that helped build capacity within IFRC (the largest
humanitarian organization in the world), and particularly
in its West and Central Africa Zone Oﬃce (WCAZ) to
understand and use of science-based forecasts leading up to
2008. Then, through interviews with all of the actors involved
in IFRC WCAZ’s 2008 disaster management process, we
proceeded with an events analysis of the organization’s
disaster preparedness and planning before the flood season
in 2008 inWest Africa, including the forecast-based decisions
made by the IFRC-WCAZ. Finally, reports and news clips
enabled the characterization of the final outcome of the 2008
rainy season, as well as the analysis of the achievements,
and limitations, of IFRC’s forecast-triggered disaster risk
management strategies.
4. Results
4.1. IFRC’s Disaster Management Strategy in 2007: Science-
Based Warning + Inaction = Avoidable Losses. In 2007,
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a seasonal forecast from the PRESAO (Figure 3) indicated
enhanced probabilities of heavy rainfall, notably,
(i) in the far west region of West Africa, straddling
Southern Chad, northern Cameroon and Nigeria,
and Eastern Niger (where above-normal rainfall was
the most likely outcome with a probability of 0.5);
(ii) an equal likelihood of normal and above-normal
rainfall conditions throughout the rest of the Sahel,
with associated probabilities of 0.4 and 0.4;
(iii) most likely normal conditions only in the Gulf of
Guinea countries, with a probability of occurrence of
0.5 [27].
When the forecast above-normal rainfall conditions did in-
deed materialize and severe floods occurred, the humani-
tarian community responded in emergency response mode,
lacking advance knowledge on when and where floods were
more likely to occur. The 2007 floods claimed more than
300 lives across West Africa and occasioned severe damage
to crops, homes, and infrastructure [28].
The Red Cross did not access the PRESAO forecast in
2007 or during previous years, due to the weak-to- non-ex-
istent communication lines between climate forecasting cen-
ters (at the regional and national levels) and the Red Cross
presence in the region (regional-level disaster planners and
community-level volunteers). On the one hand, regional
climate forecasting institutions such as the African Centre
of Meteorological Applications for Development (ACMAD)
and AGRHYMET, the regional authority for meteorological
applications to food security, duly produced their forecasts
and sent them to their national relays: NMHSs. On the other
hand, the Red Cross continued to respond to weather-related
disasters as it had always done, not using existing climate
information—which they often did not know existed—as
input into their decision making and contingency planning
at the onset of the rainy season.
Natural hazards thus consistently became disasters de-
spite the fact that (a) scientists in the region could anticipate
their likely occurrence and (b) the humanitarian sector, and
the people they serve, had the capability to act on the ground
to thwart losses. The early warning was not turned into early
action.
4.2. Building Capacity within IFRC-WCAZ to Understand and
Use Science-Based Forecasts. Over the last few years, various
processes contributed to improving the Red Cross’ capability
to link climate science with humanitarian work. These were
encouraged by a growing momentum at the global level
within the IFRC to build preparedness in the face of the
humanitarian challenges of climate change, and included the
following.
4.2.1. Growing Role of Climate Information in the Red
Cross/Red Crescent Movement. In a context of changing cli-
mate risks, the Red Cross/Red Crescent Climate Centre was
created in 2002 with the mission of supporting the Red Cross
and Red Crescent movement to understand and address the
humanitarian consequences of climate change and extreme
weather events. The Centre’s main approach is to raise aware-
ness, advocate for climate adaptation and disaster risk re-
duction, and integrate knowledge of climate risks into Red
Cross Red Crescent strategies, plans, and activities. By 2008,
a total of 39 Red Cross/Red Crescent national societies,
including 14 from Africa, had joined the “Preparedness for
Climate Change” program. Instead of only focusing on cli-
mate change information based on scenarios for the end of
the century, the program emphasized the need to link with
forecast providers to improve decisions on all timescales and
at various geographic levels from continental to community
level.
In 2007, the 30th International Conference of the Red
Cross and Red Crescent (its highest governing body, com-
prised of 186 national societies and national governments)
committed to improve capacity to respond, including
through better disaster preparedness, and to integrate climate
risk management into policies and plans. Such high-level
commitment enabled an easier uptake of oﬀers to explore
options for forecast-based humanitarian decisions. The
disaster management coordinator for IFRC West and Cen-
tral Africa Zonal Oﬃce attended and organized various
workshops co-organized by the Climate Centre aimed at
integrating climate science into disaster risk management.
4.2.2. First Steps in Science-Humanitarian Dialogue in West
Africa. Three noteworthy changes occurred in 2008 to ini-
tiate a dialogue between Red Cross staﬀ and climate fore-
casters, and to enable the transmission and use of the 2008
forecast.
(i) A new partnership between the IFRC and the Inter-
national Research Institute for Climate and Society
(IRI) at the global level enhanced the capacity of the
humanitarian organization to understand science-
based forecasts. Through this partnership, the IFRC-
WCAZ oﬃce was provided with ready access to
expertise that could explain and interpret climate
information. A help desk was established that allowed
for timely and reliable responses to questions about
forecasts or recent climate anomalies, and an intern
went to the IFRC-WCAZ in the summer of 2008
to assist disaster managers in better understanding
and incorporating climate information into disaster
planning.
(ii) In 2008, the Red Cross Disaster Management Coor-
dinator for West and Central Africa became enthusi-
astic on initiating a dialogue with climate scientists
regionally and attended the PRESAO-11, the first
time a disaster manager attended this scientific fo-
rum. Building on this initial outreach, IFRC-WCAZ
spearheaded a drive for more outreach to the climate
science community.
(iii) The severity of the 2007 floods, and memory of the
frenzied response operations that followed, put Red
Cross disaster planners in a favorable disposition
towards increased preparedness.
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When the 2008 seasonal forecast reached the IFRC-WCAZ
and warned of a heightened risk of above-normal rainfall,
and this information was translated into language that they
could understand, Red Cross disaster managers set in motion
early action strategies that appear to be common sense but
had never been implemented in the past.
4.3. The 2008 Seasonal Forecast
4.3.1. Contents of the Consensus-Based Forecast: Cause for
Concern. In May 2008, the consensus-based forecast issued
at the end of the PRESAO announced that the JAS rainy
season overWest Africa had enhanced probabilities of above-
normal rainfall, implying that the region was likely to
experience increased risk of heavy rainfall events [25]. The
PRESAO forecast, issued on May 21st 2008 by ACMAD,
indicated increased probabilities for higher than normal
rainfall throughout much of the Sahel belt from Senegal to
Cameroon (probabilities of 0.45 and 0.50 in zones I and II,
respectively; see Figure 2). Against a historical probability
of 0.33, these probabilities for above-normal rainfall were
unusually high, and warranted heeding.
An updated seasonal climate forecast issued by ACMAD
on June 27th re-aﬃrmed the forecast issued a month earlier
of high probabilities of rainfall higher than normal, and
very low probabilities of below-normal rainfall over the
region. ACMAD concluded its seasonal forecast update by
stating that if forecast conditions persisted, the risk for
flood disasters and water-related diseases could be higher
than usual this year, requiring “strengthened weather watch,
monitoring, and warning” for sectors like health, food
security, water resources, and civil protection [25].
The International Research Institute for Climate and
Society (IRI) seasonal precipitation forecast for Africa for the
July–September period echoed the same warnings, indicating
probabilities for above-normal rainfall for July–September
similar to those of the PRESAO forecast, albeit diﬀerences
in the geographic area at risk at the northern and southern
frontiers of the Sahel and inmonths covered. The IRI forecast
map for extreme seasonal rainfall (more than the 85th
percentile) for June–August gave an even stronger message,
signaling Senegal, the Gambia, and neighboring countries,
as the only areas in the world with “highly enhanced”
probabilities of rainfall extremes (see Figure 3).
As of May 2008, all the main sources (national, regional,
international) provided a unanimous message that most
parts of West Africa were more likely to experience higher
than usual rainfall over the upcoming season. Although
all these seasonal forecasts referred explicitly only to the
seasonally integrated rainfall, and not to individual heavy
rainfall events that are the primary cause of flooding, it is
reasonable to assume that the actual risk of flooding will
increase during a year in which the total rainfall is expected to
be unusually high. (Further research on the extent to which
this assumption is valid is clearly warranted.)
4.4. Communication of the Forecast to IFRC-WCAZ. When
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Figure 2: The 2008 PRESAO forecast: Probability forecast for
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Figure 3: World areas likely to be at risk of “extreme” precipitation
in the JJA season (source: [26]).
Dakar, the first challenge consisted of helping decision mak-
ers at IFRC-WCAZ understand the contents and implications
of the PRESAO forecast. The intern from IRI played an
instrumental part in this assistance and served as in-house
translator of the received seasonal forecast maps. The 2008
seasonal forecast map was largely incomprehensible to the
IFRC regional disaster managers because of the technical
language used, the absence of detailed, clear commentary,
and the lack of clarity on how the forecast information
might be relevant to their humanitarian work. To this eﬀect,
an all-staﬀ climate briefing was organized in early June by
the IFRC-WCAZ Disaster Management Unit to share the
PRESAO forecast with all operational departments at IFRC-
WCAZ. During this briefing, Figures 3 and 4 were shown and
explained by the intern.
Contrary to expectations, the probabilistic nature of the
forecast did not pose any challenges to the Red Cross disaster
planners; they welcomed it as an approximate answer to
their question: whether or not disasters were going to occur.
Even though it did not tell them with certainty whether
disasters would be taking place, it still provided them with
a rational and scientifically-informed process of making key
planning and resource allocation decisions under uncer-
tainty, one which was coherent with the way they usually
operated. Indeed, as disaster planners, they were accustomed
to preparing their relief interventions based on contingency
plans and various scenarios for intervention at the beginning
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Figure 4: Observed rains and location of stocks prepositioned
by IFRC in June–August 2008, represented by triangles (source:
authors).
of the rainy season. In the past, however, none of these plans
were informed by seasonal climate forecasts.
4.5. Linking Early Warning with Early Action: Ex-Ante Fore-
cast-Based Decisions Made by IFRC at the Regional Level
4.5.1. First Pre-Emptive Appeal in IFRC History Based on
a Seasonal Forecast. Based on the PRESAO seasonal July–
September 2008 and the IRI June–August seasonal forecasts,
the IFRC drafted a zonal Flood Contingency Plan and issued
a funding request to the Disaster Relief Emergency Fund
(DREF), an internal Red Cross funding source. This appeal
requested a total of CHF 298,376 (USD 284,167) in order to
prepare for the heightened risk of floods in the region. The
IFRC WCAZ explained in this request its worry that catas-
trophic floods were looming, drawing upon the ACMAD and
IRI forecasts as its sources of information, explaining that
while not certain the high probabilities still warranted action
and advanced preparation was needed.
This DREF request was granted. A preliminary emer-
gency appeal for flood preparedness in West and Central
Africa was then issued on July 11th, requesting USD
730,000 in contributions from humanitarian donors to fund
preparedness activities throughout the region [29]. Both
PRESAO and IRI maps were again included in this appeal
as justification for the need to get ready and prepare for
forewarned floods. It was clearly explained therein that the
forecasts were in terms of probabilities. This was the first time
in the history of the Red Cross movement that funds were
requested in advance to prepare for an emergency based on
seasonal forecast information. It constitutes a positive in-
stance of climate information duly transmitted and acted on.
Unfortunately, donors did not commit in time: funds
from the preliminary appeal did not arrive until late August,
after flood disasters were already underway. However, the
IFRC-WCAZwas still able to use funds immediately available
from the DREF to preposition emergency stocks in Dakar,
Accra, and Yaounde´ [30].
4.5.2. Prepositioning of Relief Items. Once funds were made
available, the IFRC-WCAZ began the prepositioning of
nonfood relief items (blankets, mosquito nets, soap, bottles,
tents, etc.) in Dakar (Senegal), Yaounde´ (Cameroon), and
Accra (Ghana) to benefit up to 9,500 families in the event
of flooding. Under a typical ex-post response scenario, these
items would have been flown in from the IFRC’s Dubai
warehouse once floods arrived, or procured separately, lead-
ing to a more time-consuming and costly shipment of relief
supplies.
This “no-regret” approach was the strategy used by
IFRC-WCAZ to address the uncertainty inherent in the sea-
sonal forecast. Indeed, by prepositioning only non-per-
ishable items that could be reused during future flood events,
disaster managers at IFRC-WCAZ were able to minimize
their potential losses and justify their ex-ante use of funds
without complete certainty of the occurrence of a disaster.
4.5.3. Training of Additional Red Cross Disaster Management
Personnel. Following the forecast of a high-risk rainy season
the IFRC-WCAZ trained in early July twelve leaders of
Regional Disaster Response Teams (RDRTs), to be deployed
to the field within 48 hours of a disaster in the region to
coordinate relief operations and conduct a rapid assessment
of damage and needs. These RDRT leaders were specifically
trained in understanding medium-term weather forecasts
accessible online via the IFRC’s online Disaster Management
Information System so that they would be able to monitor
rainfall throughout the season, and write national flood con-
tingency plans using real-time meteorological information.
Additionally, at the end of the training, all RDRT leaders were
provided with travel insurance (rendering them “deployable”
within 24 hours of onset of a flood disaster in the region)
and were asked to prepare a flood contingency plan for their
respective countries, by July 15th [31].
4.5.4. Partnerships with Regional Climate Centers. Finally,
a significant achievement from the 2008 experience is the
demand it created within IFRC-WCAZ for additional climate
information. Building on this strong desire to reach out
to regional climate research centers as a pathway to secure
inflow of reliable and trustworthy climate information at the
regional level, formal partnerships were initiated and put in
writing in late July with both ACMAD and AGRHYMET.
Throughout the 2008 rainy season, IFRC-WZAC reached out
to these scientific partners, inquiring about likely atmo-
spheric conditions in given countries and constantly request-
ing additional information to followup on the seasonal
forecast. This process of interaction culminated in the
signature of a Memorandum of Understanding between
ACMAD and IFRC-WCAZ, the first ever partnership accord
signed between climate scientists and humanitarians in the
region.
4.5.5. Communication of the Forecast. Utilizing the Red
Cross’ extensive network of volunteers on the ground, the
IFRC-WCAZ was able to share the seasonal rainfall forecast
with countries and communities at risk throughout West
Africa. By July, the seasonal forecast was received by all Red
Cross National Societies deemed to be at potential risk from
flooding during the July–September rainy season (countries
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located in Zones I and II, Figure 1). Varying levels of cap-
acity of these national societies, however, hindered or facil-
itated the distribution of the forecast to local Red Cross
branches at district and village levels. In many instances,
Red Cross volunteers serving as community relays of forecast
information were able to take the information to people at
risk in eﬀective ways, using distribution channels as inno-
vative as transport buses (Togo Red Cross), cellular phone
text messages (Burkina Red Cross), and word of mouth.
4.6. Outcome of the 2008 Rainy Season:
Heavy Rains and Reduced Losses
4.6.1. Rainfall during the 2008 Season. Heavy rainfall events
occurred throughout the July–September rainy season in
West Africa. Although the forecasts are probabilistic in
nature and so cannot be properly verified considering only
this single case, there are grounds for arguing that because
the forecasts indicated high probabilities of above-normal
rainfall, they were “good.” The IFRC-WCAZ reinterpreted
the forecast in terms of risk of flooding (associated primarily
with individual heavy rainfall events) within the season
rather than in terms of seasonal total rainfall, and so from
their perspective, the season contained multiple verifications
rather than a single one. In addition, for the advanced
preparedness actions undertaken, precision in the location of
areas of heavy rain was not necessary. The disaster managers
were not concerned about whether such flooding would
occur throughout the regions of increased probabilities of
unusually large seasonal totals, but only that there would
be an unusually large number of flooding events scattered
somewhere within (or, for some decisions, somewhere near)
the area of enhanced probabilities for a wet season.
Figure 4 depicts the locations of flood-related disasters
requiring Red Cross intervention in West Africa during the
2008 rainy season and shows some geographical coherence
with the seasonal forecasts: ten out of the twelve severe
flood events that took place occurred in Zone I of the
PRESAO forecast map, where above-normal rainfall had
been predicted as the most likely outcome. Only two floods,
in Togo and Cameroon, occurred in the Zone III Gulf of
Guinea countries, where the probability for above-normal
seasonal rains was close to climatology.
When the floods came, the Red Cross movement on the
ground was already aware, informed, and ready to intervene,
thanks to the preparedness measures endeavored by the IFRC
Zone Oﬃce. These initiatives helped raise awareness at the
national level in the countries at risk, where humanitarian
actors were able to initiate national-level actions to prepare
for likely flood events. In the words of Jerry Niati, Assistant
Disaster Management Coordinator at the IFRC in Dakar “In
2007, we were just being asked to do things; in 2008, we were
initiating action by raising awareness and sharing forecast
information” [32].
4.6.2. Damage and Losses Reduced. A preliminary IFRC
assessment of the results of having engaged in early action
during the flood season 2008 concluded that after the initial
region-wide preparations had been put in place, more direct
action at the local level could be taken in response to shorter-
range forecasts. Because of this early action, the following
outcomes at national and community levels were possible.
(i) In Ghana, the Volta River Authority Power Company
and its Burkinabe counterpart SANOBIL agreed
upon a control regime to protect communities along
the Black and White Volta Rivers during the 2008
rainy season. Volunteers of the Ghana Red Cross
thus set out to advise fishermen not to go out
on the river between August 21–23, the announced
period of excess spillage from the Bagre Dam. These
actions saved lives and reduced damage in August and
September of that year compared t0 2007 [28].
(ii) In Togo, in response to the 2008 seasonal forecast,
a communication system was established to enable
the circulation of information from the national Red
Cross society’s headquarters, to contact focal points
in the regions, districts, and communities at risk and
back. In the community of Atiegou Zogbeji located
north of Lome´, a community leader went through
the flood-prone community with a loudspeaker when
riverbed water levels reached dangerous levels asking
people to evacuate [33]. With just an hour and a
half ’s notice, the population of approximately 2000
was able to evacuate. When the floodwaters arrived,
physical damage occurred, but no loss of life [28].
(iii) In response to being informed of the seasonal forecast
and participating in the RDRT leaders’ training, the
Gambia held its own National Disaster Response
Team (NDRT) training, in which volunteers and
branch oﬃcers from seven diﬀerent districts were
trained in disaster preparedness. As a result of this
training and preparation, the Gambia Red Cross
proved very eﬃcient in performing a postflood needs
assessment and submitting a funding request within
two days of flooding (a process which generally took
them several weeks after the flood event).
Across the region in 2008, most countries received needed
relief supplies from the Red Cross in a matter of days after the
flooding. In contrast, the year before it took on average forty
days to deliver many relief items and services. A preliminary
quantitative comparison between the costs of flood response
alone (2006 and 2007) and the cost of flood response with
Early Warning-Early Action (2008) also showed a 33% lower
cost per beneficiary [28].
These assessments are only indicative, but they attest to
the positive results that can be yielded when disaster planning
is informed by climate science.
5. Discussion: Towards Systematic Early
Warning-Early Action in West Africa
The Red Cross’ 2008 experience with forecast-based disaster
planning in West Africa clearly demonstrates the potential
of climate forecasts to inform decision making and serve
society. It also confirms all of the constraints identified by the
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literature that explain why forecasters and decision makers
have not been collaborating with each other.
An analysis of the Red Cross’ 2008 experience, however,
reveals that a number of systemic elements can also serve to
be instrumental to overcome these constraints. These are as
follows (Table 1).
5.1. A Confident Forecast. Two positive attributes of the 2008
seasonal forecasts were particularly instrumental in polariz-
ing the attention of Red Cross disaster planners and spurred
them to action.
(1) The forecast was confident. The signal over West
Africa in 2008 was strong enough that all the
forecasting models under consideration indicated
enhanced above-normal rainfall probabilities over
most of West Africa. The agreement between the
forecasts, combined with the strongmessage from the
IRI “Extreme Precipitation” forecast map (Figure 4),
was instrumental in making decision makers appre-
ciate the level of urgency of the forecast.
(2) The forecast was timely. Following the attendance of
the IFRC regional disaster manager to the PRESAO,
the seasonal forecast was received by IFRC-WCAZ
in late May, which gave one-month lead time to the
humanitarian organization to trigger early prepared-
ness actions (request funds for flood preparedness,
inform communities at risk, train more disaster relief
personnel, etc.).
5.2. The Use of “No-Regret” Strategies, a Useful Approach
to Act on Probabilistic Forecasts. Events in 2008 evolved in
line with the most likely scenario of above normal rainfall.
However, the anticipated heavy rainfall could have failed to
verify and events could have unfolded contrary to expecta-
tions. Indeed, there was still a 0.5 probability of normal or
below-normal rainfall, combined, to occur in Zone II, and
even higher probabilities in Zones I and III. Given the large
inherent uncertainty in the seasonal forecasts, one positive
strategy that the Red Cross adopted to address lingering
uncertainty was to implement no-regret strategies. No-regret
strategies consisted of actions and interventions that did
not involve the commitment of resources to emergency
relief goods or services that could go to waste if no floods
materialized. These included prepositioning relief items that
national Red Cross disaster managers could reuse during
successive years if forecast floods did not occur in 2008, as
well as capacity building and training of additional Red Cross
community volunteers on first aid and disaster assistance
procedures, needed in any case as part of the Red Cross’
daily operations during peace as well as crisis time. In this
sense, whether the most likely scenario forecast materializes
or not, the situation that ensues is still a win-win from the
standpoint of the decision maker committing resources on
the basis of the forecast. This strategy of investing in no-
regret initiatives (which are beneficial even in the baseline
without any disaster) is an eﬀective win-win strategy to
address the uncertainty inherent in climate forecasts.
5.3. Funding for Forecast-Based Early Action: A Challenge to
Continued Use of Seasonal Forecasts to Trigger Emergency Pre-
paredness. Expanded use of forecasts to trigger emergency
preparedness will require that donors are willing to support
such activities. Indeed, 2008 was the first time that a seasonal-
forecast-based flood preparedness appeal was issued, and
given the novelty of the endeavor, the severity of the 2007
floods, as well as the urgency beckoned by the forecast, the
IFRC Regional Oﬃce was able to request and secure some
funds for preparedness. However, most of the limited funds
only arrived when the floods were already underway.
The main reason explaining donors’ slow response may
be that forecast-based preparedness falls through the cracks
of the two well-established disaster management funding
channels that currently exist: (a) postdisaster work (response,
recovery and reconstruction) and (b) long-term risk reduc-
tion work (often as part of regular development assistance).
Most donor agencies lack mechanisms specifically designed
to support humanitarian action based on forecasts on
diﬀerent timescales. Action based on forecasts may seem
too emergency focused to justify funding through regular
development assistance channels, but too early to warrant the
use of disaster relief budgets, often perceived as being meant
to relieve true human suﬀering once a disaster occurs.
Because of this gap between funding for relief and long-
term risk reduction, there is a need for a dialogue between
humanitarian organizations and donor agencies on how best
to support forecast-based humanitarian action. Some have
suggested that the new international climate change financ-
ing arrangements could play a role in filling that gap [34].
Such dialogues should be built on strong evidence on the
potential benefits of forecast-based interventions, in terms
of quality of humanitarian outcomes, and in terms of
cost eﬀectiveness of financing for humanitarian relief.
Donors will probably not adequately support this early
warning-early action approach unless they are provided with
reliable, rigorous information proving how collaboration can
lead to eﬀective reduction of losses and/or more eﬃcient use
of scarce resources.
In 2008, the only truly rapid funding came from the
Disaster Response Emergency Fund (DREF), a special mech-
anism dedicated for quick response before a full appeal is
launched, for smaller disasters where no appealmay be issued
at all, and to start humanitarian action for imminent (rather
than only actual) disasters. Similar fund-based mechanisms
perhaps specifically aimed at action based on probabilistic
forecasts rather than at responding to single disasters seem to
be a good vehicle for expanded forecast-based preparedness
activities.
5.4. Packaging and Content of Climate Information Unfit for
Community Decision Making. Save for the notable example
of the community of Atiegou Zogbeji in Togo that evacuated
in response to a flood early warning issued by the National
Red Cross of Togo, the 2008 seasonal forecast did not
contribute to trigger meaningful behavioral change beyond
the regional and national levels. This is a conspicuous
limitation of the 2008 use of seasonal climate information
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Table 1: Key Achievements, Limitations and Lessons learnt from the Red Cross’ 2008 Early Warning-Early Action initiative in West Africa.





Initiation of a dialogue between Red
Cross-West Africa and regional
climate providers (ACMAD,
AGRHYMET); formal partnership
established with ACMAD, securing
inflow of reliable climate
information (at the seasonal to
short-term timescales)
Insuﬃcient capacity in
humanitarian sector to provide
scientists with meaningful feedback
on how to tailor forecasts to
humanitarian needs.
No packaging of provided
information to the specific decision
making needs of communities at
risk
(i) Increased provision of feedback
to scientists on provided
information and continued
exchanges.
(ii) Overcome the obstacles to
community level access and use of
climate information, through
participatory processes bringing
together providers of climate
information with communities at
risk





Shift from a mindset of Response to
one of Preparedness through use of
forecast (understanding that
climate risk can be managed);
Managers of the Red Cross Disaster
Relief and Emergency Fund (DREF)
convinced to release funds ex-ante
of floods’ onset based on seasonal
climate forecast.
Early warning-early action not
systematic; funding of emergency
appeal too little, too late;
absence of international funding
frameworks for forecast-based
disaster management
(i) Systematize early action through
the development of standard
operating procedures, clearly
assigning roles and responsibilities
for action.




by Red Cross: win-win strategy,
eﬀective way of placing
loss-minimizing bet on
probabilistic forecast
No clearly defined thresholds of
intervention, or chain of command
to carry out early actions following
forecasts
Define clear thresholds of
intervention, linking early actions
to specific early warnings for
relevant hazards probabilities of
occurrence
(3) Technical (content of
forecasts unintelligible to
decision makers)
2008 forecast timely (adequate lead
time), contextual, and confident
Forecast still not usable by decision
makers as unintelligible without an
in-house climate translator
Render climate forecasts less
technical and jargon-filled, more
understandable to users untrained
in climate science, through detailed,
clear forecast commentary in lay
language; establish help desks.
—
Low capacity of users to understand
and use forecasts
Build capacity of users to absorb
forecasts and understand their
uses/limitations through
user-scientist trainings; initiative
mostly urgent at national level to
enable meaningful Early
warning-early action at the
community level
(4) Scientific (low skill
level)
Realization that existing seasonal
forecasts over West Africa provide
information useful for disaster
managers (e.g., likelihood of
above-normal rainfall over the
course of the season)
Limited forecasting skill over West
Africa render current seasonal
forecast irrelevant to decision
making needs of community-level
stakeholders; climate forecasts
unable to respond to key
information needs of end users in
the region (e.g., onset of rainy
season, rainfall distribution across
season); regional climate research
not driven by the information needs
of decision makers
Decision maker needs to inform
future regional climate research
(user-driven research), namely on:
(a) threshold identification and
probabilistic representation using






(5) Limited capacity to act
on forecasts
Use of existing community-level
capacity (Red Cross volunteers,
solidarity groups at community
level) to disseminate early warnings
to communities at risk
In context of low human
development, very limited capacity
to act on seasonal forecast
information
Supplement seasonal warnings with
accompanying measures that enable
communities to act on received
information, adopt behavioral
change, and increase their resilience
to forecast hazards
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Table 1: Continued.
Obstacle type Achievements Remaining obstacles Recommendations
(6) Low trust in forecasts
A consensus-based confident
forecast (high probabilities)
inspired confidence in the climate
science to inform decision making
This time the high probabilities for
above normal rainfall announced in
the forecast materialized
themselves; in the future when
probability level is invalidated will
the same trust remain? Is there
enough understanding among Red
Cross decision makers about the
uncertainties inherent in the
forecasting process?
(i) Better explanation of the science
and limits of climate forecasting
(and the uncertainties involved in
the process of climate forecasting)
to develop trust.
(ii) Participatory, sustained and
reiterated workshops explaining, to
regional, as well as national and
community-level end stakeholders
uses of climate information
that suggests that, in their current form, seasonal forecasts
are best able to inform decision making at the regional and
national levels, but not to lead to useful behavioral change in
communities at risk. The bottlenecks to climate information
access and use beyond the regional and national levels
remain and will require more focused eﬀorts for climate
information to be relevant and accessible to community-level
stakeholders.
5.5. Summary of Findings. Most obstacles to seasonal fore-
cast use remain in place even now. The packaging of
the seasonal forecast is far from ideal, capacity to absorb
information remains low, procedures and donors are still
focused more on response than prevention. In 2008, the
strong confident signal for likely above-normal rainfall and
the presence of an in-house climate information translator
and of an institutional champion open to innovation allowed
for the seasonal forecast to be transmitted and acted on by
the Red Cross. These conditions are not guaranteed to ensure
ongoing progress unless sustained eﬀorts are maintained
to turn early warnings into early actions through standard
practice—not just within IFRC and other humanitarian
organizations, but also in the climate-meteorological com-
munity at large, and among donors.
The Red Cross in West Africa used a seasonal forecast to
inform its disaster planning in 2008 in ways that saved lives,
preserved livelihoods, and increased the resilience of com-
munities at risk. This experience teaches that the distance
between the climate science community and humanitarians
can be bridged to generate positive outcomes for vulnerable
populations, provided that there exist the following.
(1) A community of climate information providers ready
to engage with users and respond to their informa-
tion needs;
(2) a drive among humanitarian workers, and more
generally, end users, to access and understand climate
information and act upon it when there is a suﬃ-
ciently strong signal;
(3) a disaster management framework (including the
donor community) that facilitates a shift from
response to preparedness, with mechanisms to mobi-
lize resources for loss-reducing ex-ante measures at
various timescales;
(4) community relays able to take the information to
people at risk in eﬀective ways.
This successful example of ex-ante flood management was
stimulated through capacity building and institutional in-
vestments, new partnerships, and sustained user-scientist
dialogues. These are important lessons about constraints to
climate information use in Africa.
The results presented in this article are only suggestive;
a thorough evaluation of the early warning-early action
approach that started in 2008 is needed, one that will require
longer time series and more rigorous impact assessments.
But the Red Cross’ 2008 flood management experience in
West Africa demonstrates what can happen when a seasonal
rainfall forecast, one that is confident, and timely, is duly
accessed, understood, trusted and acted on by decision
makers. In so doing, it also provides a valuable illustration
of the applications that can be made of probabilistic seasonal
forecasts (notably through no-regret strategies), with posi-
tive impacts for communities at risk.
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